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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to reflect on custom as a source of law in the
Argentinean and comparative legal systems. The study of custom has been
divided into three sections. The first section locates custom among the sources
* The author is an attorney from the Province of Mendoza, Argentina. He is a member of the
Latin American Council for the Study of International and Comparative Law (COLADIC), a member of the
Department of International Public Law of the Law School of the University of Mendoza and has served as
Administrator of the National Argentinean Rounds of the Phillip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court
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of law, defines its concept, and analyzes its historical evolution, the elements
that comprise it, as well as the modalities it can assume in its relationship with
the law. The second section thoroughly examines the reception given to the
custom by Dalmacio V6lez Sarsfield in the Argentinean Civil Code (1871)
redacted by him. Subsequently, we consider the reform of said Code, driven by
Guillermo Antonio Borda through the Decree/Law 17.711 of 1968. In this
framework, a brief reference is developed regarding the position that custom
has in Argentinean labor and employment law. The third section focuses on
recent situations generated in Europe and Latin America related to custom and
concludes with its revaluation as a source of law.
II. SOURCES OF LAW
The expression "source of law" dates back to antiquity and its meaning has
differed according to the desired result.' In the present article, reference is
made to this expression in its formal aspect, understanding as such those norms
or rules of positive law from which rights and duties to others emanate.2 In this
sense, as expressed by Julio Csar Cueto Rfia, sources of law are those
"instances observed by judges, legislators, public officials, and administrators
when they must assume the responsibility of creating a legal norm ... for a
concrete case."3 As a result, among the sources of law we find positive law and
custom.
4
Ill. CONCEPT
In defining custom, the doctrine unanimously maintains that it is "the
constant and uniform observance of a [rule of conduct] by the members of a
social community, with the conviction that custom responds to a legal
necessity."5
1. See LUIS DIEZ-PICAzO, EXPERIENCIAS JURIDICAS Y TEORIA DEL DERECHO [LEGAL EXPERIENCES
AND THEORY OF LAw] 110, 111-18 (3d ed. 1999). The origin of the term "sources" as applied to the field
of law is found in the Tractatus de Legibus of Cicero (I century, A.D.). The modem idea of legal sources
arose in commentaries that were, in turn, produced in Title H of the I st Digest and were generalized in the
European literature of the XVIII and XIX centuries with Savigny, Putcha and Vallet de Goytisolo. Id.
2. GUILLERMO BORDA, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL [TREATY] 59 (14th ed.) (Editor's Note: this
source has not been verified).
3. JULIO CUETO ROA, FUENTES DEL DERECHO [SOURCES OF LAw] 13, 20 (Abeledo-Perrot 1994).
4. GUILLERMO E. GARBINO ET AL., 1 CODIGO CIVIL Y LEYES COMPLEMENTARIAS: COMENTADO,
ANOTADO Y CONCORDADO [CIVIL CODE AND COMPLEMENTARY LAWS: DISCUSSED, ANNOTATED AND
AGREED] 90 (4th ed. 1993).
5. Enrique V. Del Carril & Mariano Gagliardo, La Costumbre como Fuente de Derecho [Custom
as a Source ofLaw], 56 E.D. 26 (1974) (citing ROBERTO DE RUGGIERO, INSTrruCIONES DE DERECHO CIVIL
[INSTITUTIONS OF CIVIL LAw] 80 (4th ed. 1929)).
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In this sense, putting into evidence the comprising elements that turn an
act or omission into legally binding conduct, it is affirmed that a "custom is the
reiteration of spontaneous forms of conduct by members of a determined
societal group, with the conviction that it comply with a legal rule since it
pertains to a legal necessity."6
On the other hand, there is an important difference between customs and
simple social usages, with regard to the nature and intensity of sanctions.7 The
simple social usage does not impose sanctions or, in the case that it does, these
are very slight They are a small malaise in the majority of cases. In contrast,
"a custom causes [major upheavals] in the community and imposes sanctions
to transgressors."9 It is not a difference in nature or genre, but merely of kind.'°
IV. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
The importance of custom as a source of rights and obligations has varied
significantly over time, characterizing itself by its permanent tension with
positive law." Thus, three historical moments are recognized. In the first
stage, marked by an absolute legislative decentralization, custom was con-
sidered superior to the law. 12 In the first societies, which were less evolved and
therefore more homogenous, custom appears as the exclusive source of the law
accepting as binding immemorial uses received by means of tradition. 3 With
the later cultural development and outburst of written law in the Roman legal
system with the Law of the XII Tables, the transition from consuetudinary law
to written law took place and custom and the law became equals. 4 Finally, as
the interpersonal relations became more complex, heterogeneous and numerous,
it was necessary to determine, with more precision, the content and extent of
6. Eugenio 0. Cardini, La Costumbre en Nuestro Derecho Civil [Custom in our Civil Law], 122
L.L. 1091, 1094 (1966).
7. Julio Cdsar Castiglione, La Costumbre Juridica [The Legal Custom], 2000 L.L.N.A. 730, 732
(2000).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Carlos Alfredo Hemrrndez, Orden Publico y Buenas Costumbres: La Costumbre Como Fuente
de Derecho y las Buenas Costumbres Como Estbndar Juridico [Public Order and Good Customs: Custom as
a Source of Law and Good Customs as the Legal Standard], 3 REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO Y
COMUNrTARIO 181 (2007).
12. Id.
13. GARBINO, supra note 4, at 90.
14. See Del Carril, supra note 5, at 804-05; see also Hernndez, supra note 11, at 181-82.
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rights and obligations. 5 This way, the lack of certainty and uniformity of
customs made it possible for the law to be considered the superior source.' 6 in
addition, the peak of the rationalist positivism inspired by the Napoleonic Code
of the XIX Century and the German Code of the XX Century, allowed the
legislative technique to be perfected gradually, whereas the field of custom
continued narrowing down.' 7
V. CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS
Scholars understand that not all customs are considered a source of law.
A usage must "necessarily rely on specific elements that characterize a
consuetudinary norm, otherwise it will not be considered mandatory."' 8 The
characteristic elements of custom are: material, subjective and axiological. 9
A. Material
1) Constant and Uniform Operations: Requiring a repetition of
constant, homogenous and uninterrupted actions. As such, it is
important to follow a similar line of conduct with respect to
identical situations;
20
2) Generality: It is required that the usage be accepted by the
greater number of people in identical cases and not only by a
determined sector;2
3) Duration: The importance of this element has varied through
time, becoming indispensable when custom was considered to
be under the realm of adverse possession.22 Nevertheless, the
modem approach does not require a fixed term, upholding that
it is not necessary, thus leaving this element open to judicial
discretion as a matter of fact;23
15. GUILLERMO A. BORDA, MANUAL DE DERECHO CIVIL: PARTE GENERAL [MANUALOF CIvIL LAW:
GENERAL PART] 46 (14th ed. 1999).
16. Herntadez, supra note 11,at 181.
17. See generally BORDA, supra note 2.
18. GARBINO, supra note 4, at 91.
19. See Del Carril, supra note 5, at 804-05; see also GARBINO, supra note 4, at 91-92.
20. GARBiNo, supra note 4, at 91-92.
21. Id. at92.
22. The Canonical Laws (Cannons 27 and 28) have set a forty year period for the praeter legem
custom and a period of a hundred years for the contra legem custom. GARBINO, supra note 4, at 92. La Ley
de Partidas [The Law of Items] (Points 1, 2 and 5) demanded a 10 or 20 year period. Del Carril, supra note
5, at 805. It was defined that custom ".... is non-written law that men have used luengo tiempo [for a long
time] .... Castiglioni, supra note 7, at 735.
23. Cardini, supra note 6, at 1094; Del Carril, supra note 14, at 805.
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4) Public: The law shall not be secretly applied. This arises in a
parallel way to the requirement ofpublication of written laws;24
and
5) Patientia Principis: The Government tolerates the custom.25
B. Subjective-Opinio Juris et Necessitatis
"It is the general conviction that the usage that is followed is a legal rule
that must be accepted as such, or otherwise would be mandated and coerced."26
This element allows for the distinction between custom and mere usage or
27practice.
C. Axiological
Custom means exemplarity when it follows patterns of conduct considered
rational and moral by society.28 In this sense, all types of worthless behavior
must be discarded (for example, non-payment of debts or taxes) and the
absolute freedom of customs must be restrained through diverse limits, such as
through general principles of law and human dignity.29
VI. THE LAW AND TYPES OF CUSTOM
In general, three kinds of relationships between custom and law have been
recognized.3" These are the customs secundum legem,praeter legem and contra
legem.
3 1
A. Custom Secundum Legem
This is custom which is expressly recognized within the law and which
becomes valid as soon as the legislation allows it to operate.32 The law remands
the custom, subordinating its operation to the approval of the legislator.3 In
24. Hernindez, supra note 11, at 188.
25. Cardini, supra note 6, at 1094.
26. GARBINO, supra note 4, at 93
27. Id. at 92-93.
28. See Del Carril, supra note 5, at 805; see also ANTONIO VAZQUEZ VIALARD ET AL., TRATADO
DE DERECHO DEL TRABAJO [LABOR LAw TREATY] 432 (1982).
29. See Del Carril, supra note 5, at 805; see also DfEZ-PICAZO, supra note 1, at 148; Philippe Le
Tomeau, Derecho y Etica [Law and Ethics], 99 C LL. 1(2008).
30. Cardini, supra note 6, at 1095; see also Castiglioni, supra note 7, at 737.
31. Cardini, supra note 6, at 1095.
32. Id.; see also Castiglioni, supra note 7, at 737.
33. Castiglione, supra note 7, at 737.
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fact, the inclusion of custom into the text of the law is what grants it its
obligatory force, thereby eliminating the subjective element of opinio iuris et
necessitates.34 In this case, it is not actually a source of law.35
B. Custom Praeter Legem
This type of custom arises spontaneously at the margin of legal disposi-
tions, completing the legal gaps in cases of unregulated matters or matters
deficiently regulated by the law.36 Historically, the custompraeter legem was
always relegated to a subordinate level of importance. Thus, the codification
process of the XIX Century served to solidify the principle of supremacy of
written law over other sources of law and to conceive the "supremacy" of the
legal order.37 In cases of legal gaps, it must be resorted to elements of existing
norms, such as the analogy to another legal norm and general principles of law,
but never to external sources like custom.3" Nevertheless, in our opinion, the
negation of the custom praeter legem is excessive and incompatible with the
reality of the law. Indeed, in instances where the law has not anticipated
solutions, legal relations are ordered spontaneously and fill those gaps. 39 At the
present time it is admitted with total value, nevertheless maintaining the
supremacy of the law.4°
C. Custom Contra Legem
It is defined as custom which negates a rule of law.4' Between the various
types of custom, custom contra legem is the one that has always been the
subject of great academic discussion and which has consequently resulted in
antagonist positions with respect to its validity and the possibility of reversing
the law.42
For those authors who adopt a monist position and interpret the law merely
as a system of positive rules, it is not acceptable for custom to prevail over the
34. GARBINO, supra note 4, at 94.
35. Id,
36. Cardini, supra note 6, at 1095.
37. Hernindez, supra note 11, at 194.
38. Castiglione, supra note 7, at 737.
39. Seegenerally Guillermo A. Borda, ElDerechoJurisprudencia General, in, LA REFORMA DEL
C6DIGO CIVIL 28 E.D. Jurisp. Gral. 817, 820.; see also GARBINO, supra note 4, at 95.
40. Garbino, supra note 4, at 95.
41. Id.
42. Del Carril, supra note 5, at 806.
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law and cause the latter to lose its effectiveness. Those authors embrace the
principle of legislative preeminence.43
On the other hand, those who defend the system of plurality of sources
maintain that if law is considered to be both a norm and a legal reality, then
custom, as expression of that reality, can abrogate the law." Thus, when the
law arises from a political system and from a social framework, it could not
contradict the customs or the legal sense of the community, without suffering
a serious decline of its authority.45 The custom contra legem would be the right
to resist unfair laws. 6
In our opinion, the second posture is the correct one. Indeed, when there
are certain differences between the social feeling and legal norms, the result
may well be the abandonment of the law and the creation of an opposite
custom. 47 In this sense, to deny that the laws can be abandoned or that society
can create opposite conducts to those of written norms is to ignore the social
dimension of the law and the principle of reality.4" We deem that it would be
clearly impossible to accept the fiction of a binding law when it in fact does not
function to deter its subjects from not following and respecting it.49
Nevertheless, we cannot forget that legal order, through its norms, impels
towards a certain direction and that the evolution of custom need not be
necessarily promoted by the law.50 Normative cannot be reduced to normality."
VII. THE ARGENTINEAN CIVIL CODE, ARTICLE 17
A. The Code of Dalmacio Vilez Sarsfield
In its original language, Article 17 of the Civil Code established that "the
laws cannot be repealed entirely or in part, except though by other laws.
Usages, customs, or practices cannot create rights, except when the laws
43. I MIGUEL S. MARIENHOFF, TRATADO DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATY] 306 (5th ed. 2000). [Editor's Note: This Source has not been verified.]
44. See GARBINO, supra note 4; see also Del Carril, supra note 5, at 801-11.
45. GARBINo, supra note 4, at 95.
46. AMADO ADp, CONFLICTO ENTRE LA LEY Y COSTUMBRE [THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CUSTOM
AND LAW] 43 (2nd ed. 1975); see also GARBINO, supra note 4, at 96.
47. It is important to distinguish imperative norms from dispositive norms, accepting the value of
the custom contra legem only regarding the latter. The derogation of imperative norms does not proceed as
a result of being in the public order. That way, the labor law assures minimum standards for the worker that
cannot be modified through any other conventional dispositions or customs. See GARBINO, supra note 4, at
96.
48. Imerio J. Catenacci, Desuso y Desuetudo, L.L. 1994-C 232 (1994).
49. Castiglione, supra note 7, at 737.
50. Le Tomeau, supra note 29, at 3.
51. Id.
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specifically refer to them."52 For the writing of this article, D. Vdlez Sarsfield
resorted to the legislation of Spanish origin (Novisima Recopilaci6n), the
Chilean Code of Andrds Bello, the Austrian Code and the Dutch Code, as well
as the Project of Goyena.13
The drafter only admitted the custom secundum legem, as indicated by the
article, denying any value to customs contra legem and praeter legem.54
However, with respect to the latter, the jurisprudence paved the way for
numerous consuetudinary norms, as was the case of the names of certain
individuals, such as the last name of married women, (whose omission was
considered to be a serious insult and cause for divorce), the legal regime
applicable to cemeteries, salaries, and the labor and employment regime."
With respect to the restrictive deference given to the custom by D. Vdlez
Sarsfield, we believe that it responded to the historical frame in which the Civil
Code was legitimized, immersed in the prevailing criteria of legal positivism of
the XIX Century." Thus, the situation was "coherent with the national project
being developed because the latter was grounded in the absolute respect of
private ownership [the supremacy of the rule of law] and the rigid affirmation
of the principle of freedom of contracts."57
According to rationalist authors of that time, recognizing the mandatory
effect of the custom would violate Articles 19 and 22 of the National
Argentinean Constitution which establish that no person shall be "compelled
to do what the law does not command, or be deprived of that which the law
does not prohibit," and that the people do not deliberate or govern except by
means of their representatives. 8 To recognize custom as a source of rights and
obligations would imply jeopardizing the aforementioned principles, since the
people would be able to directly establish the legal norm instead of doing so by
means of their representatives.59
This position has been subject to later revisions and criticism, indicating
that the term law as mentioned in Article 19 refers to every legal rule containing
52. Cardini, supra note 6, at 1097; see also Hemrndez, supra note 11, at 201.
53. Cardini, supra note 6, at 1100.
54. Id. at 1099-1100.
55. See id. at 1100-03. The married woman was registered under her maiden name. With the
maiden last name, her identification card would be expedited, but the customary norm imposed the use of the
marital name. GARBINO, supra note 4, at 95.
56. Hernindez, supra note 11, at 194-95.
57. During the same time, 1872, the great writer Jose Hermindez published the first part of Martin
Fierro, a masterpiece of Argentine gaucho literature.
58. CONST. ARG., Ch. 1, art. XIX & XX, available at http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/consnac/
consnac.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009); Borda, supra note 39, at 819-20.
59. Id.
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an obligatory character, regardless of whether or not it is enacted by the
legislative branch (decrees, regulations, jurisprudence).' With respect to
Article 22 and the republican principle of government, it is not against
admitting customs as a source of the law.6 In any event, we must emphasize
that D. Vdlez Sarsfield did not ignore the importance of the custom, as he
demonstrates in the note to Article 167 of the Civil Code when he refers to the
role of the law, sustaining that it is "to maintain and to increase the power of the
customs and not to enervate or corrupt them."62
B. The Reform of the Decree/Law 17. 7116
Almost a century after the passing of the Civil Code,' the reform
introduced by the Decree/Law 17.71165 prompted a new spirit in the civil
legislation. Thus, it recognized a system of plurality of sources, being these, the
law, usages, customs, and the general principles of law.
When modifying the previous Article 17, it established that "usages and
customs cannot create rights unless the laws specifically refer to them or in
legally unregulated situations. 66 The text of new article 17 establishes a
general principle and two exceptions.67 As a rule, it maintains the preeminence
of the law as hierarchically superior to the custom as a source of the law ("the
usages and customs cannot create rights"). 6 As a first exception, the reform
maintained the custom secundum legem in its original language ("but only when
laws refer to them"). 69 The legislative innovation came with the inclusion of
the second exception, by expressly accepting the binding authority of the
custom praeter legem in those cases of "legally unregulated regulations."70
With the reform, the custom praeter legem was elevated by admitting judicial
rules in addition to statutory norms.7'
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Castiglione, supra note 7, at 736.
63. LawNo. 17711, Apr. 26, 1968, [CXVI] B.O. 1.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Del Carril, supra note 5, at 809.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also Borda, supra note 39, at 819.
71. Jorge Mosset Iturraspe, El Plexo Normativo: El Finalismo de las Leyes, los Usos y Costumbre
(En el Proyecto de Unficaci6n) [The Regulatory Plexus: The Finality of Laws, Uses and Custom [In the
Unification Project) ], D L.L. 1087, 1088 (1987).
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With respect to the validity of the custom contra legem, the Decree/Law
17.711 suppressed the solution devised by D. Vdlez Sarsfield by repealing
Article 17, which established that "the laws cannot be repealed entirely or in
part except by other laws."72  This way, the controversy regarding its
admissibility remains open.73 In effect, the silence of the reformed article
"opens the door to the possibility of an exceptional recognition of the
abandonment of the law as derogatory of the law."74
On one hand, the jurisprudence has been particularly critical of the school
ofthought that proposes a favorable interpretation ofthe custom contra legem.75
On the other hand, more favorable towards the custom contra legem, is the very
author of the reform, Guillermo A. Borda, guided by a less formal and more
realistic approach to the legal world.76 Furthermore, in response to the criticism
that resulted from the legislative silence regarding this issue, Borda argues that
if the law expressly establishes that it can be repealed by the custom, this would
"imply an anarchical principle because it would suggest that merely disobeying
the law would cause it to lose its binding effect., 77
VIII. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
It is interesting to emphasize that the Argentinean legal system not only
recognizes custom as a source of law for civil legislation, but also in other legal
disciplines of its other branches, such as labor and employment law.78
72. Borda, supra note 39, at 819.
73. Id.; Hernindez, supra note 1 I, at 196.
74. Borda, supra note 39, at 820.
75. Hemindez, supra note 11, at 196. For example, the maneuver realized by a person causing a
railroad accident-in this case, by passing two other automobiles that were waiting for the train to pass and
intending to cross it while the barriers were down, in zigzag and without first observing if a convey was
approaching-is not common sensical. Even though this could be habitual on the part of pedestrians and
vehicles, the maneuver that the victim has realized in order to cross the tracks does not alter its condition as
illegal and violative of the Decree/Law 13.893, since it is known that the custom contra legem cannot
generate laws. See Alicia N. Descole, Dahosy Peryuicios [Damages and Prejudices], L.L. 590, 590 (1998).
76. Hemndez, supra note 11, at 196. "One case of contra legem custom, if well within the field
of Constitutional Law, is the non-application ofjury trials, pursuant to art. 24 of the National Constitution."
CONST. ARG., Ch. I, art. XXIV, available at http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/consnac/consnac.htm (last visited
Apr. 3, 2009).
77. Borda, supra note 39, at 820 (citing to JEAN CRUET, LA VIE DU DROIT ET L'IMPUISSANCE DES
Lois [THE LIFE OF THE LAW AND THE IMPOTENCE OF THE LAw] (5th ed. 1908)). "Yes, it is true that nonuse
obliterates laws, but it is better to not say so." Id. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW.
78. In the case of the Argentine Republic, the Contract Labor Law (Article 1) and other Latin
American laws that have accepted custom as a source of law are: Mexico (Article 17); Brazil (Article 8);
Colombia (Article 19); Costa Rica (Article 15); Guatemala (Article 15); and Nicaragua (Article 11). Ley
Federal del Trabajo [L.F.T.] [Federal Labor Law], art. 17, as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO.]
[Official Journal of the Federation], Apr. 1, 1970 (Mex.), available at
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Historically, custom has carried out a central role in the area of labor and
employment law.79 In itspraeter legem function, together with the dispositions
of the civil law, it constituted the system of norms applicable to employment
relationships in the periods prior to the birth and development of labor and
employment legislation."0 Nevertheless, when confronted with the current
phenomenon of legislative inflation and collective bargaining within public
labor law, the custom has lost its preeminence.8 The general principle is the
admission of the custom as a formal source of law, while there are exceptional
situations that arise when the social sentiment departs from the positive labor
and employment legislation and confronts the principle of legislative
supremacy. 2
Similar to civil law, labor and employment law accepts the same
classification of the custom as secundum legem, praeter legem and contra
legem. With respect to the characteristics of labor and employment custom, the
doctrine holds that the same is local, since it is only accepted in a determined
geographic and professional area because it refers to a specific activity. 3
Consequently, its application by analogy does not apply to different situations.8 4
Within this background we find the denominated "company usage" generated
http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Federal/Combo/L-130.pdf(last visited Apr. 3,2009); Decreto No. 5.452,
May 1, 1943, D.O.U. 9.8.1943, art. 8 (Brazil), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivilVDecreto-Lei/
Del5452compilado.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2009); Decreto 3.743, art. 46 of 1950, C6digo Sustantivo del
Trabajo [Substantive Code of Labor], art. 17, June 7, 1951 (Colom.), available at http://www.
secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/codigo/codigosustantivo trabajo.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2009);
C6digo del Trabajo [Labor Code], Law No. 2, art. 17, Aug. 26, 1943 (Costa Rica), available at http://www.
mopt.go.cr/documentos/Maritimo-Portuaria/L.2.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2009); C6digo del Trabajo [Labor
Code], Decreto No. 1441, art. 15, 1947 (Guatemala), available at http://www.mintrabajo.gob.gt/org/leyes-y-
convenios/leyes-ordinarias/codigo-de-trabajo (last visited Mar. 27, 2009); C6digo del Trabajo [Labor Code],
Law No. 185, art. 11, Sept. 5, 1996, La Gaceta [L.G.] No. 205, Oct. 30, 1996 (Nicaragua), available at
http://www.construccion.com.ni/files/ley/1204139277_Codigo%20del%2OTrabajo%20de%2ONicaragua.pdf
(last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
79. Vazquez, supra note 28, at 438.
80. See id.
81. See Diego M. Tosca, Fuentes del Derecho del Trabajo [Sources of Labor Law], in I TRATADO
DE DERECHO DEL TRABAJO, TEORiA GENERAL DEL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO [TREATY OF LABOR LAW,
GENERAL THEORY OF LABOR LAW] 557 (Rubinzal & Culzoni eds., 2005). While providing the example of
the prohibition of receiving gratuitous payments (tips), imposed by the gastronomic ruling approved in
Decree/Law 4.148/46, ratified in statute section 12.291 (currently repealed by statute section 22.310).
According to Articles 2 and 4, its perception constitutes failure to execute the labor contract and justified its
dismissal. Id. Nevertheless, the disposition was never fulfilled and in practice, the workers of the particular
sector observed that benefit. Id.
82. See id.
83. JUSTO L6PEZ ET AL., I LEY DE CONTRATO DE TRABAJo COMENTADA [CONTRACTUAL LABOR
LAW DISCUSSED] 20 (1977); see also Tosca, supra note 81, at 556.
84. L6PEz, supra note 83, at 20.
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by the repeated and uniform conducts of each company. 5 In each one of them
arises an institutional order made up of unwritten rights and obligations that
binds the employed work force.86 These company practices become true rules
with binding effect when they are expressly recognized in first instance by the
jurisprudence and later by the positive legislation, as has been the case with
salary practices and their binding effect for the future, the leaves of absence
longer than legally mandated and the disciplinary authority which allows an
employer to suspend a worker.87
IX. BURDEN OF PROOF
The burden of proof of a custom is subordinated to its notoriety in each
specific case. Thus, when ajudge has knowledge of its existence because it has
been recognized by judicial precedent or treated in a particular fashion by a
qualified doctrine, it becomes a matter of law and the court can, and must, apply
it as the obligatory legal norm, with no need for proof (iura novit curia).88
Nevertheless, if the existence of the consuetudinary norm has been contradicted
or if the judge does not know it or has invoked it as a standard of interpretation
(as is the case with commercial law), the proof is the very existence of the facts,
shifting the burden to the alleging party by proving its material constituent
elements.89
X. LATIN AMERICAN LEGISLATION
The relevance of the custom as a source of law varies significantly
according to the type of legal system. In the scope of comparative law, it has
great importance in the common law system, in Islamic law and the law of
recently decolonized countries in which the colonial legislation (imported,
imposed) is complemented in light of the local consuetudinary norms90 (for
example, African Law).9'
85. Tosca, supra note 81, at 558-59.
86. Id.
87. The cases were primarily dealt with pursuant to the jurisprudence and then through Contract
Labor Law. Id. at 559; see also Vazquez, supra note 28, at 439-41.
88. GARBINO, supra note 4, at 97; see also Cardini, supra note 6, at 1096-97.
89. Id.
90. MARIO G. LozANO, Los GRANDES SisTEMAS JuRaCOS, INTRODUCCI6N AL DERECHO EUROPEO
Y EXTRANJERO [THE GREAT LEGAL SYSTEMS, INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN AND FOREIGN LAw] 164-65
(Alfonso Ruiz Miguel trans., Editora Debate 1993) (1982).
91. Id.
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On the other hand, with respect to Latin American countries, they share
common historical and cultural values. 92 Because custom is a relevant part of
the culture, we can see the existence of a common legal base to the countries
of the Mercosur93 and Latin America in general.94 Therefore, there is a Latin
American legal system of Hispanic-Roman-local character, constituted by legal
norms and shared principles of law. 95 In this sense, it is typical of the Latin
system that statutes are considered the main source of law, superior to the
custom, and non-legislated matters are governed by the consuetudinary law. 96
XI. COMPARISONS BETWEEN SOME LATIN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE NORMS
A. Venezuela
"Laws can only be repealed through other laws; and neither its
abandonment nor custom or contradictory usage can be alleged to excuse its
non-observance, no matter how old or universal they are."97
B. Mexico
Custom is admitted in some cases as a delegated source of law. For
example:
[W]ith reference to Article 17 of the Federal Labor and Employment
Law, in order for the custom to be invoked as such, and demand its
recognition and definite implementation, it is necessary that the
following circumstances concur:
a) That there be a repeated and uninterrupted usage for a
considerable time;
b) That such usage be done with the consent of the parties;
c) That the consensus be constituted as the governing norm in
certain relations; and
92. RicARDO Luis LORENZETrI, LAS NORMAS FUNDAMENTALES DE DERECHO PRIVADO [THE
FUNDAMENTAL NORMS OF PRIVATE LAw] 224 (Rubinzal & Culzoni eds., 1995).
93. Id. at 225.
94. Id. at 224.
95. Id.
96. GARBINO, supra note 4, at 91.
97. Cod. Civ. Titulo Preliminar de las Leyes y sus Efectos, y de las Reglas Generales para su
Aplicaci6n [Civil Code Preliminary Title of the Laws and its Effects, and of the General Rules for its
Application], No. 2.990, art. 7, July 26, 1982 (Venez.), available at http://www.cajpe.org.pe/RIJ/bases/
legisla/venezuelve20a.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
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d) That the usage does not contradict other legal or contractual
dispositions ...."
XII. CURRENT TENDENCIES
During the XIX Century, the codified legislation neglected custom as a
source of law by considering it incompatible with the judicial construction of
the rationalist positivism. However, contemporary times marked by a strong
globalization of legal norms, the overcoming of national barriers, and an
increase in multiculturalism, place custom as a subject of great importance.99
Within this new framework, the question that has raised concerns is the
meaning and extension of the term "custom."
On the one hand, current European law shows a greater social and legal
pluralism resulting from the increasing number of immigrants."' Plurality of
languages, religions, moral lifestyles and standards has impacted the law and
has produced a modification of great importance in the concept of custom. A
clear example of the new limits and meaning was present in the recent decision
of a French court which annulled the marriage of a Muslim couple because the
bride had lied about her virginity.' The husband, reacting to the Muslim
cultural requirement to consider the virginity of the woman until marriage a
legal obligation, denounced the situation and asked for the annulment of the
union. 2 The Court annulled the marriage on the grounds that the husband
acted "under an objective error."' 3 Previous jurisprudence has permitted the
annulment of marriages for completely different situations, such as when one
of the parties has lied about his or her divorced status, when one of the parties
98. ENRIQUE CRUZ MARTNEZ & MARIO CRUZ MARTNEZ, EsTuDios EN HOMENAE A DON JORGE
FERNANDEZ Ruiz: DERECHO INTERNACI6NAL Y OTROS TEMAS 83 [STUDIES IN HONOR OF DON JORGE
FERNANDEZ Ruiz: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER MATTERS] (2005) (citing to Semanario Judicial de la
Federaci6n y su Gaceta, t. XI, Junio 2000. Tesis: 1.60. T. J/31, p. 492), disponible en
http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/4/1628/7.pdf) (61tima visita 27 de marzo de 2009); Ley Federal del
Trabajo, supra nota 78.
99. Hern~mdez, supra note 11, at 183-84.
100. Id. at 184.
101. Anulan laBoda Porque la Novia no era Virgen [Nullity ofa Marriage Because the Bride was
not a Virgin], LA NACION, May 31, 2008, at 1, available at www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?
notaid=1017153&origen, (last visited Mar. 27, 2009). Keep in mind that France is a secular country
through its excellence under which all signs pertaining to religion have been prohibited (such as Islamic veils,
kipas, and crucifixes, etc.) within the administration of public schools. TRIBUNAL DE GRANDE INSTANCE DE
LILLE, Chambre 1 07/08458, JUGEMENT Du 01 Avril, 2008 at I.
102. Id. at 2-3.
103. Id. at 3.
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had previously engaged in prostitution, or when one of the parties was a convict
sentenced to forced labor (1862). 14
This decision demonstrates the current process that most European Union
countries face with respect to the existence of new values and imported cultural
patterns, and the gradual acceptance of such as legally obligatory in both the
national and communitarian legislative systems.
On the other hand, in the general Latin American system, the
multiculturalism generated by the massive immigration of the XIX and XX
Centuries, is nowadays a subject of analysis, particularly emphasizing the
matter of rights of the original indigenous peoples. 1"5 Thus, in the case of
Argentina, in the 1994 reform of the National Constitution, Article 75, Section
17 was enacted, establishing in pertinent part that it corresponds to the National
Congress:
To recognize the ethnic and cultural preexistence of the Argentinean
indigenous peoples. To guarantee the respect of their identity and the
right to a bilingual and intercultural education; to recognize the legal
existence of their communities, the possession and ownership of the
land which they traditionally occupy ... these will not be alienable,
transferable, nor susceptible to encumbrances or embargoes .... 6
In this sense, the doctrine and the national jurisprudence asks whether the
new constitutional system allows the indigenous communities to have their own
private legal system with a consuetudinary source, departing from the
legislation common to the rest of the nation's inhabitants. 1°7
Those authors whose answer is positive, consider that Article 75, Section
17 of the National Constitution recognizes a special regime, clearly operative,
meaning a historical compensation that must be applied to all its extent.'
Also, this position maintains that the property regime consecrated by the
mentioned article is a new regime that supersedes the traditional concept in
which the individual relation prevails, making its inclusion in the Civil Code
104. Id.
105. HernAndez, supra note 11, at 183-84.
106. CONST. ARG., Ch. IV, art. LXXV, § 17, available at
http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/consnac/consnac.htm (last visited Apr. 3,2009); see Hernindez, supra
note 11, at 185.
107. See Hernindez, supra note 11, at 185; see also "Comunidad Mapuche Huayquillhn c/ Brescia
Celso y otro s/prescripcion adquisitiva" JUZGADO DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA EN LO CIVIL,
COMERCIAL, LABORAL Y DE MINERiA CON COMPETENCIA EN LA FAMILIA DE LA V
CIRCuNsCRIPCION JUDICIAL DE LA PROVINCIA DEL NEUQUEN (Sentencia Firme) Aug. 18,2004.
108. Id.; see also Hermindez, supra note 11, at 185.
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unnecessary and inconvenient." 9 In fact, it must be interpreted according to the
customs of the indigenous peoples since those communities have very particular
ties with the land of their ancestors." 0
We consider that the recognition of the preexistence of indigenous
peoples, as well as other social groups that invoke for themselves their own
legal and differentiated statutes by reason of ethnicity or culture, is a subject of
great importance. As such, it requires concrete positive action and usually puts
at issue the existence and survival of the nation."' For example, the recognition
of the communitarian property of the Argentine indigenous peoples would
imply a modification of the legislation and legal principles of private property
contained in the Civil Code."12
XII. CONCLUSION
This article has been analyzed through the broad interpretation of the term
"law," understanding that it is a complex system integrated by a plurality of
different sources. From this perspective, the intimate entailment between law
and custom is understood, creating among them a deep degree of
complementariness that varies according to the time, place, idiosyncrasy and
habits of each society." 3  Thus, the relaxation of the customs drives the
proliferation of positive norms, known as legislative inflation, typical of our
time and opposite to the principles of legal certainty.' ' However, the excessive
resorting to custom over law can result in anarchy.'
The positivist postulates of the XIX century, such as the belief in the
perfection of the work of the legislator and that the legal ordering is only made
up of positive norms, gradually demonstrated their inaccuracy and became
subject to a series of legislative reforms." 6 In the particular case of Argentina,
through the reform in 1968 of the Civil Code, there was an attempt to revalue
custom as a source of law and to stop demeaning it."7
109. Comunidad Mapuche Huayquillin, supra note 108.
110. Commission No. IV of the XVIII National Civil Law Week (Editor's Note: this Source has not
been verified).
111. MARiA ANGELICA GELLI, CONSTITUCIN DE LA NACI6N ARGENTINA, COMENTADA Y
CONCORDADA [CONSTITUTION OF THE ARGENTINE NATION, DISCUSSED AND AGREED] 573-74 (2d ed. 2004).
112. Id.
113. Miguel Anguel Ciuro Cadani, Reflexiones Sobre la Ley y la Costumbre, in JURISPRUDENCIA
ARGENTINA, 4 J.A. 789, 790 (1979).
114. Le Torneau, supra note 29, at 3.
115. Ciuro Caldani, supra note 114, at 795.
116. See generally Castiglione supra note 7, at 736.
117. See Castiglione, supra note 7, at 736.
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In our opinion, custom, in a globalized and dynamic world, acquires
pivotal positions unthinkable in past years and leads to a new analysis and
reconsideration in the area of law. For example, as product of vast European
migration, a question arises with respect to what cultural patrons are elevated
to the category of legally obligatory, as in the case of native indigenous
communities the recognition of groups with their own legal statutes.
In this sense, we have considered that custom is an important source of law
in the present legal system and as such, judges, lawyers and scholars shall have
to pay greater attention to it, since it is a spontaneous way to regulate legal
relations and to agglutinate in a basic nucleus those coinciding values that allow
participation in a social setting." 8
118. J. C. CUETO ROA, LA ACTITUD DE LOS JUECES FRENTE A LAS COSTUMBRES Y LAS NORMAS
CONSUETUDINARIAS [THE ATTITUDE OF JUDGES AGAINST CUSTOMS AND CUSTOMARY NORMS], 80 J.A. 156
(1996).
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